Crane crash

By IR Jan Henriksen OH&S rep MV Portland

I rejoined MV Portland in July last year relieving Jim Richard as CIR. We both attended 'The Toolbox' meeting on the ship's bridge that morning. A long list of jobs was discussed: economiser wash, ship's stores, main engine, scavenge clean, greasing crane wires, stores, cranes and main deck cranes to be tested by Lloyds surveyor, general duties etc.

We had an enormous task ahead and were one crew member, an IR short. But it was not entirely impossible.

An elevated platform boom was ordered for one day only to grease the crane wires. To save time, Robert Shaw and I went up in No.2 Crane and I lowered the jib over the water on the port side of the ship, before moving the block and hook about 1m above the water line.

The idea was to grease the wire as much as possible from inside the cab and top it up at the same time. There would be less wire to do with 'The Cherry Picker'.

I lowered the jib down to approximately housing and cradle level, that is 90 degrees and perpendicular to the cab and parallel with the water.

I must have gone too far and the crane came crashing down.

The investigation by Alcoa (OH&S) Lloyds & AMSA found there are only three turns left on the luffing wire drum where it is anchored when the jib is in the housing cradle.

Those three turns, because of the four wire purchase on the jib represents only about 1m-2m of distance jibbing up or down.

I did not know this! Why did I not know this? Because I have never greased these crane wires before. All cranes I have ever driven can go right down to deck level.

The surveyors, Lloyds and AMSA have exonerated me as I had insufficient knowledge and inadequate induction about the type of crane. The dangers had not been highlighted by Hagglunds and the ship's owner had not passed the necessary details to the crew because there was no 'driver manual' onboard. Why not?

Hagglunds' safety laminated instruction card of 'Do's and Don'ts' does not mention anything about the last three turns on the luffing drum or the danger once you start turning the housing 'override key' for lowering.

After being told that No.1 Crane is sometimes lowered to critical point over No.2 hatch to stay out of line of sight for pilotage purposes, the surveyors were surprised that it hasn't happen before. It has happened on other ships.

A 'warning card' has now been taped next to drive controls in both cranes. If this had been done when the ship was first commissioned, there would never have been an accident.

I suggest AMSA should notify all shipping company industrial officers and get them to send SQ memos to all ships about this problem.

Seafarers are not inducted correctly on crane driving safety. Workcover Authority's Guide For Crane and Hoist Drivers states clearly in regulation 144 (11) (A) & (C):

(A): eye splices, sockets, and rope anchorages shall be capable of 90% per centum of the guaranteed breaking strength of the rope or ropes to which they are attached.

This did not work in this case.

(C): there shall be at least 2 full turns of each rope, remaining on the drum or barrel when the hook or other lifting or hauling medium is fully lowered or unwound.

The question is, what is fully lowered, the cradle or the deck?

There are also other dangers and in related regulations it states: "The Driver must fully inspect the crane and understand its mechanical properties before driving it."

Robert Shaw and I were in deep shock for several weeks. Luckily nobody was injured.